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ABSTRACT In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of 
solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et 
al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their 
ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to some objections. I describe then a third line 
of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more 
adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy 
also holds when one takes into account the issue of indeterminism and the reference class problem. 
This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the 
original one. 
 
 
In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument (DA, for short) based on a third type of 
solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et 
al. analysis. In section 1, I describe the Carter-Leslie view. In section 2, I review the Eckhardt et al. 
line of reasoning. I point out then in section 3 an atemporal-temporal disanalogy in the Carter-Leslie 
analogy, which leads to the description of a strengthened variation of this latter model. In section 4, I 
raise some criticisms against the Eckhardt et al. analogy, thus leading to reformulate this latter analogy 
more accurately. I argue in section 5 that both competing models are capable of handling an 
indeterministic situation. I present then in section 6 a two-sided analogy that incorporates insights 
from both Carter-Leslie's and Eckhardt et al.'s models. Finally, I show in section 7 that this two-sided 
model is capable of handling the reference class problem and leads to a novel formulation of the 
argument.1 
 
 
1. The Carter-Leslie View 
 
Let us begin by sketching briefly the Doomsday argument. The argument can be described as a 
reasoning leading to a Bayesian shift, from an analogy between what has been termed the two-urn 
case2 and the corresponding human situation. Consider, first, the two-urn case (slightly adapted from 
Bostrom 1997):3 
 
                                                          
1
 The solution to DA presented here is a somewhat condensed and enhanced version of the ideas expressed in 
Franceschi (2002), that also discusses at length the problems related to DA: God's Coin Toss, the Sleeping 
Beauty Problem, the Shooting-Room Paradox, the Presomptuous Philosopher. 
2
 Cf. Korb & Oliver (1998). 
3
 Cf. Bostrom (1997): 'Imagine that two big urns are put in front of you, and you know that one of them contains 
ten balls and the other a million, but you are ignorant as to which is which. You know the balls in each urn are 
numbered 1, 2, 3, 4 ... etc. Now you take a ball at random from the left urn, and it is number 7. Clearly, this is a 
strong indication that that urn contains only ten balls. If originally the odds were fifty-fifty, a swift application of 
Bayes' theorem gives you the posterior probability that the left urn is the one with only ten balls. (Pposterior 
(L=10) = 0.999990)'. 
 2 
The two-urn case An urn4 is in front of you, and you know that it contains, depending on the 
flipping at time T0 of a fair coin, either 10 (tails) or 1000 (heads) numbered balls. The balls are 
numbered 1, 2, 3, .... At this step, you formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions with P(Hfew) = 
P(Hmany) = 0.5 and you try to evaluate the number of balls which were contained at T0 in the urn. 
You know all the above and you randomly draw a ball from the urn at time T1. Now you get the 
ball #5 at T1. You conclude then to an upward Bayesian shift in favour of the Hfew hypothesis. 
 
The two-urn case constitutes an uncontroversial application of Bayes' theorem. It is based on the two 
following competing hypotheses: 
 
 (H1few) the urn contains 10 balls 
 (H2many) the urn contains 1000 balls 
 
and the corresponding prior probabilities: P(H1) = P(H2) = 0.5. Taking into account the fact that E 
denotes the available evidence that the random ball is #5 and P(E|H1) = 1/10 and P(E|H2) = 1/1000, a 
Bayesian shift ensues from a straightforward application of Bayes' theorem. As a result, the posterior 
probability is such that P'(H1) = 0.99. 
Let us consider, on the other hand, the human situation corresponding to DA. Now being concerned 
with the final size of the human race, you consider the two following competing hypotheses:  
 
 (H3few) the number of humans having ever lived will reach 1011 (doom soon) 
 (H4many) the number of humans having ever lived will reach 1014 (doom later) 
 
Now it appears that each human has his own birth rank, and that yours is roughly 60x109. Let us 
assume then, for the sake of simplicity, that the prior probabilities are such that P(H3) = P(H4) = 0.5.5 
Now according to Carter and Leslie, the human situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the two-
urn case.6 Let us denote by E the fact that your birth rank is 60x109. Thus, an application of Bayes' 
theorem, taking into account the fact that P(E|H3) = 1/1011 and P(E|H4) = 1/1014, leads to a vigorous 
Bayesian shift in favor of the hypothesis that Doom will occur soon: P'(H3) = 0.999. For this reason, 
the Carter-Leslie line of thought can be summarized as follows: 
 
 (5) in the two-urn case, a Bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew ensues 
 (6) the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the two-urn case 
 (7) ∴ in the situation corresponding to DA, a Bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew 
ensues 
 
From the Carter-Leslie's viewpoint, the analogy with the urn is well-grounded. And this legitimates 
DA's conclusion according to which a Bayesian shift in favor of doom soon ensues. This last 
conclusion appears paradoxical or at least counter-intuitive. But the task of diagnosing what is wrong, 
if any, with the Doomsday Argument proves to be very difficult and remains an open question. 
At this point, it is worth mentioning in passing that the reasoning based on the two-urn case does not 
yield absolute certainty. This last reasoning is probabilistic and as such, it leads to a true conclusion in 
most cases. If the experiment is repeated many times and you bet accordingly, you will win in most 
cases. But it must be acknowledged that you will sometimes lose. For consider the situation where the 
coin lands heads and the number of balls in the urn is 1000. In this last case, if you get the ball #5, the 
reasoning based on the two-urn case leads to the false conclusion that the urn contains only 10 balls. 
However, this does not preclude us from regarding the corresponding reasoning as sound. For in the 
long run, it is reliable and yields many more true conclusion than false ones. The following table 
summarizes this situation: 
                                                          
4
 Bostrom's original description of the two-urn case refers to two urns. For the sake of simplicity, I refer here to 
one single urn (containing either 10 or 1000 balls) instead of two, since it is equivalent to the original two-urn 
case. 
5
 The reasoning remains unaltered if we consider some alternative prior probabilities (with 0 < P(H3) < 1). 
6
 More precisely, Leslie considers an analogy with the lottery case. 
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two-urn case (numbered balls) 
toss outcome reference class (numbered balls) # prediction reasoning 
 tail (doom soon) 10 numbered balls #5 true sound 
heads (doom later) 1000 numbered balls #5 false sound 
 
 
 
2. The Eckhardt et al. Analysis 
 
A line of objection to the Doomsday argument initially raised by William Eckhardt (1993, 1997) and 
recently echoed by George Sowers (2002) and Elliott Sober (2003) runs as follows. The analogy with 
the urn at the origin of DA, so the objection goes, is ill-grounded. For in the two-urn case, the ball 
number is randomly chosen. But in the human situation corresponding to DA, our birth rank is not 
randomly chosen, but rather indexed on the corresponding temporal position. Hence, the analogy is ill-
grounded and the whole reasoning is invalid. Eckhardt notably stresses the fact that it is impossible to 
make a random selection when there exists numerous unborn members in the chosen reference class.7 
Sober (2003) argues along the same lines,8 by pointing out that no mechanism having the effect of 
randomly assigning a temporal location to human beings, can be exhibited. Lastly, such a line of 
objection has been recently revived by Sowers. He emphasizes that the birth rank of each human is not 
random, because it is indexed on the corresponding temporal position.9 
In parallel, according to the Eckhardt et al. analysis, the human situation corresponding to DA is not 
analogous to the two-urn case, but rather to an alternative model, the consecutive token dispenser. The 
consecutive token dispenser is a device, initially described by Eckhardt,10 that expels consecutively 
numbered balls at a constant rate: "(...) suppose on each trial the consecutive token dispenser expels 
either 50 (early doom) or 100 (late doom) consecutively numbered tokens at the rate of one per 
minute". A similar device - call it the numbered ball dispenser - is also mentioned by Sowers:11 
 
There are two urns populated with balls as before, but now the balls are not numbered. Suppose you 
obtain your sample with the following procedure. You are equipped with a stopwatch and a marker. You 
first choose one of the urns as your subject. It doesn't matter which urn is chosen. You start the stopwatch. 
Each minute you reach into the urn and withdraw a ball. The first ball withdrawn you mark with the 
number one and set aside. The second ball you mark with the number two. In general, the nth ball 
withdrawn you mark with the number n. After an arbitrary amount of time has elapsed, you stop the 
watch and the experiment. In parallel with the original scenario, suppose the last ball withdrawn is 
marked with a seven. Will there be a probability shift? An examination of the relative likelihoods reveals 
no. 
 
Thus, according to the Eckhardt et al. line of thought, the human situation corresponding to DA is 
not analogous to the two-urn case, but rather to the numbered ball dispenser. And in this latter model, 
the conditional probabilities are such that P(E|H1) = P(E|H2) = 1. As a consequence, the prior 
probabilities of the two alternative hypotheses Hfew and Hmany are unchanged. Hence, the 
corresponding line of reasoning goes as follows: 
 
 (8) in the numbered ball dispenser, the prior probabilities remain unchanged 
                                                          
7
 Cf. (1997, p. 256): 'How is it possible in the selection of a random rank to give the appropriate weight to 
unborn members of the population?'. 
8
 Cf. (2003, p. 9): 'But who or what has the propensity to randomly assign me a temporal location in the duration 
of the human race? There is no such mechanism.'. But Sober is mainly concerned with providing empirical 
evidence against the hypotheses used in the original version of DA and with broadening the scope of the 
argument by determining the conditions of its application to concrete situations. 
9
 Cf. (2002, p. 40): 'My claim is that by assigning a rank to each person based on birth order, a time correlation is 
established (...).' and also (2002, p. 44): 'The doomsday argument has been shown to be fallacious due to the 
incorrect assumption that you are a random sample from the set of all humans ever to have existed.'. 
10
 Cf. (1997, p. 251). 
11
 Cf. (2002, p. 39). 
 4 
 (9) the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the numbered ball dispenser 
 (10) ∴
 in the situation corresponding to DA, the prior probabilities remain unchanged 
 
thus yielding P(Hfew) = P'(Hfew) and P(Hmany) = P'(Hmany). 
 
 
3. Strengthening the Carter-Leslie Analogy 
 
As we have seen, according to the Carter-Leslie view, DA is based on an analogy between the human 
situation corresponding to DA and the two-urn case. By contrast, from the Eckhardt et al. standpoint, 
the analogy associates the human situation corresponding to DA and the numbered ball dispenser. In 
what follows, I shall argue that both analogies suffer from some defects and consequently do not prove 
fully adequate. This leads finally to reformulating the analogy more accurately. 
Consider, to begin with, the analogy with the two-urn case inherent to the Carter-Leslie view. Let us 
consider the characteristics of the human situation corresponding to DA. A summary analysis reveals 
indeed that this last situation is temporal. In effect, the birth ranks are successively attributed to human 
beings in function of the temporal position corresponding to their appearance on Earth. Thus, the 
corresponding situation takes place, say, from T1 to Tn, 1 and n being respectively the rank numbers of 
the first and of the last human. By contrast, the two-urn case is atemporal, for at the moment where the 
ball is randomly drawn, all balls are already present in the urn.12 Consequently, the two-urn case takes 
place at a given time T0. At this step, it appears that the two-urn case is rendered in an atemporal 
model while the situation corresponding to DA needs to be modeled in a temporal one. In short, the 
situation corresponding to DA being temporal, and the two-urn case being atemporal precludes us 
from regarding the two situations as isomorphic.13 The importance of the atemporal-temporal 
disanalogy will become clearer later. Roughly, its importance rests on the fact that an atemporal model 
leads to one single model, while considering a temporal one engenders several competing probabilistic 
models. In addition, considering a temporal model is best suited for taking into account the issue of 
indeterminism and the reference class problem. In any case, at this step, it is apparent that the human 
situation corresponding to DA being temporal should be put in analogy more accurately with a 
temporal experiment. 
The atemporal-temporal disanalogy being stated, let us investigate now how this inconvenient could 
be overcome. Consider then the following experiment, which can be termed the incremental two-urn 
case (let us denote it by two-urn case++): 
 
The synchronic and deterministic two-urn case++ An urn is in front of you, and you know that it 
contains, depending on the flipping at time T0 of a fair coin, either 10 (tails) or 1000 (heads) 
numbered balls. At time T1, you randomly draw the ball #e from the urn. Then a device expels 
at T1 the ball #1, at T2 the ball #2..., and finally at Te the ball #e.14 Once the ball #e expelled, the 
device stops. You formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5 and 
you try to evaluate the number of balls which were contained at T0 in the urn. Now you know all 
the above and you get the ball #5 at T5 when the device stops. You conclude then to an upward 
Bayesian shift in favour of the Hfew hypothesis. 
 
The novelty in this variation is that the experiment presents a temporal feature, given that the random 
selection is made at T1 and the chosen ball is ultimately expelled at T5. It is also worth pointing out 
that in the synchronic and deterministic two-urn case++, the total number of balls in the urn is 
definitively fixed at T0, when the experiment begins. For this reason, the corresponding situation can 
be termed deterministic. An instance of the synchronic and deterministic two-urn case++ is as follows: 
 
                                                          
12
 It could be pointed out that a small amount of time is necessary to perform the Bayesian shift, once the 
problem's data are known. But this can be avoided if one considers ideal thinkers, who perform Bayesian shifts 
at the time when they are informed of the data relevant to the corresponding situation. 
13
 I borrow this terminology from Chambers (2001). 
14
 From now on, I assume that the intervals of time, i. e. from T1 to Tn, are regular. Considering alternatively 
irregular intervals of time would not result in significant differences in the present account. 
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time T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
flipping tails      
range  1-10     
random #  5     
ball #  1 2 3 4 5 
  
At this step, it should be emphasized that anyone who accepts the conclusion of the two-urn case 
would also be committed to accepting the Bayesian shift resulting from the incremental two-urn case. 
Furthermore, it appears that other variations of the incremental two-urn case can even be envisaged. 
For consider the following variant: 
 
The diachronic and deterministic two-urn case++ An opaque device contains an urn that has, 
depending on the flipping at time T0 of a fair coin, either 10 (tails) or 1000 (heads) numbered 
balls. At time T1, a robot inside the device draws a ball at random in the urn (containing the 
balls #1 to #n) and then replaces it in the urn. The device expels then the ball #1; if the ball #1 
has been drawn then the device stops at T1; else at T2, the robot draws a ball at random in the 
urn (now containing the balls #2 to #n) and the device expels the ball #2; if the ball #2 has been 
drawn then the device stops at T2; ...; else at Ti, the robot draws a ball at random in the urn (now 
containing the balls #i to #n) and the device expels the ball #i; if the ball #i has been drawn then 
the device stops at Ti; else at Ti+1, etc. Now you know all the above and you get the ball #5 at T5 
when the device stops.15 You formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) 
= 0.5 and you conclude to an upward Bayesian shift in favor of the Hfew hypothesis. 
 
In this last case, the random selection is performed gradually and is only made effective when the 
number of the randomly drawn ball equals the number corresponding to the temporal position, i. e. 
when the ball #i is drawn at Ti. This contrasts with the synchronic version of the experiment, where the 
random selection is made definitively at time T1. Nevertheless, in the diachronic and deterministic 
two-urn case++, the probability of drawing the ball #n at Tn still equals 1/n. Let us denote by E the fact 
of drawing the ball #5 at T5. It follows that the probability of drawing the ball #5 at T5 if the urn 
contains 10 balls is such that P(E) = 9/10 x 8/9 x 7/8 x 6/7 x 5/6 x 1/5 = 1/10. An instance of the 
diachronic and deterministic two-urn case++ is as follows: 
 
time T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
flipping tails      
range  1-10 2-10 3-10 4-10 5-10 
random #  4 7 9 6 5 
ball #  1 2 3 4 5 
 
where the random selection is only made effective at time T5. 
 
At this step, it should be pointed out that the incremental two-urn case (whether synchronic or 
diachronic) does not face the above-mentioned criticisms concerning the atemporal-temporal 
disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to DA and the original two-urn case. For it has 
been shown that the human situation corresponding to DA, being temporal, cannot be put in analogy 
with the two-urn case, which is atemporal. By contrast, the incremental two-urn case is a temporal 
experiment. Thus, the incremental two-urn case meets the above mentioned requirements concerning 
the analogy and can be put legitimately in analogy with the human situation corresponding to DA. In 
this context, we now face a variation of DA which can be stated explicitly as follows: 
 
 (11) in the incremental two-urn case, a Bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew ensues 
 (12) the situation corresponding to DA is analogous to the incremental two-urn case 
                                                          
15
 This can be equivalently rendered with the following computer algorithm: at T1, draw randomly a number 
between 1 and n; if 1 is issued then display 1 and stop; else at T2, draw randomly a number between 2 and n; if 2 
is issued then display 2 and stop; ...; else at Ti, draw randomly a number between i and n; if i is issued then 
display i and stop. 
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 (13) ∴ in the situation corresponding to DA, a Bayesian shift of the prior probability of Hfew 
ensues 
 
And this last variation is not vulnerable to the above objection. The analogy with the urn is now 
plainly plausible, since both situations are temporal. 
At this point, it is also worth scrutinizing the consequences of the incremental two-urn case (whether 
synchronic or diachronic) on the Eckhardt et al. analysis. For in the incremental two-urn case, the 
number of each ball expelled from the device is indexed on the rank of its expulsion. For example, you 
draw the ball #60000000000. But you also know that the preceding ball was #59999999999 and that 
the penultimate ball was #59999999998, etc. However, this does not prevent you from reasoning in the 
same way as in the original two-urn case and from concluding to a Bayesian shift in favor of the Hfew 
hypothesis. In this context, the incremental two-urn case has the following consequence: the fact of 
being time-indexed does not entail that the ball number is not randomly chosen. Contrast now with the 
central claim of the Eckhardt et al. analysis that the birth rank of each human is not randomly chosen, 
but rather indexed on the corresponding temporal position. Sowers in particular considers that the 
cause of DA is the time-indexation of the number corresponding to the birth rank.16 But what the 
incremental two-urn case and the corresponding analogy demonstrates, is that our birth rank can be 
time-indexed and nevertheless considered as random for DA purposes. And this point can be regarded 
as a significant objection to Sowers' analysis. This last remark leads to consider that the concrete 
analysis presented by Sowers does not prove however sufficient to solve DA. For the problem is 
revived when one considers the analogy between on the one hand, the human situation corresponding 
to DA and on the other hand, the incremental two-urn case. One can think that it is this latter analogy 
which constitutes truly the core of the DA-like reasoning. In this context, Sowers' conclusion 
according to which his analysis leads to the demise of DA appears far too strong. Echoing Eckhardt, 
he has certainly provided additional steps leading towards a resolution of DA and clarified significant 
points, but Sowers' analysis does not address veritably the strongest formulations of DA. 
 
 
4. Refining the Eckhardt et al. Analogy 
 
Let us consider, on the other hand, the analogy with the numbered ball dispenser, which is 
characteristic of the Eckhardt et al. line of thought. As mentioned above, Eckhardt describes the 
consecutive token dispenser, where the tokens are expelled from the urn at constant rates ("one per 
minute"). Sowers also describes an analogous experiment, where the balls are expelled from the urn 
and numbered accordingly, at the constant17 rate of one per minute. In this last experiment, the balls 
are numbered in the order of their expulsion from the urn. 
However, the numbered ball dispenser can be criticised on the grounds that its protocol seems 
inaccurately defined. This inaccuracy concerns in particular the mechanism that expels a given ball #n 
at Tn. What makes the device stops at Tn after the ball #n has been expelled? The numbered ball 
dispenser seems to be designed for whatever way of choosing a given ball. So, could it be said, 
whatever mechanism allowing the choice of the ball #n would be acceptable. But this won't do as a 
response, I think. For consider for example a deterministic situation, where the total number of balls in 
the urn is already settled before the experiment begins. And suppose that a device chooses a ball at 
random at T1 in the urn, say #5, and expels then accordingly the balls #1 at T1, #2 at T2, #3 at T3, #4 at 
T4, #5 at T5 and then stops. It appears then that the corresponding situation is fully isomorphic with the 
                                                          
16
 Cf. Sowers (2002, p. 40): 'My claim is that by assigning a rank to each person based on birth order, a time 
correlation is established in essentially the same way that the stopwatch process established a correlation with 
the balls.'. 
17
 It could be pointed out that both Eckhardt's and Sowers' experiments do not exactly correspond to the human 
situation corresponding to DA. For in this latter situation, the humans appear on Earth at variable intervals of 
time, while Eckhardt and Sowers consider constant rates. However, this last disanalogy can be regarded as a 
minor qualm. For both Eckhardt's and Sowers' experiments could be eventually restated with items which are 
expelled at irregular rates instead of constant ones. In this context, a constant rate numbered ball dispenser can 
even be regarded as a useful simplification, for our present purposes of modeling the human situation 
corresponding to DA. 
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synchronic and deterministic two-urn case++. Thus, at least on one particular interpretation, the 
numbered ball dispenser proves to be identical to the synchronic and deterministic two-urn case++. But 
as we have seen, this latter experiment leads to a straightforward Bayesian shift in favour of the Hfew 
hypothesis, in complete opposition with the numbered ball dispenser which leaves the prior 
probabilities unchanged. Arguably, such interpretation of the numbered ball dispenser should be 
discarded, given that it is at the opposite of the Eckhardt et al. viewpoint. But this shows that the 
protocol of the numbered ball dispenser stands in need of refinement and must be defined more 
accurately. This urges us to search another interpretation of the protocol of the numbered ball 
dispenser that fits more adequately with the spirit of the Eckhardt et al. line of thought. 
Let us consider, second, another interpretation. Such interpretation arises from Sowers' description of 
the numbered ball dispenser. Sowers mentions in effect that the last ball is #7 ("In parallel with the 
original scenario, suppose the last ball withdrawn is marked with a seven"). Now let us repeat the 
experiment many times. In the long run, the numbered ball dispenser will always yield the ball #7 (or 
alternatively, a small number). Under this interpretation, the repeatability of the experiment shows that 
the numbered ball dispenser has a bias towards #7. Although it should be acknowledged that this 
biased numbered ball dispenser is also one possible interpretation of the numbered ball dispenser, I 
don't think neither that it fits adequately with what Sowers' has in mind. For it seems that Sowers is 
concerned with a last ball expelled which is marked with whatever number (recall "In general, the nth 
ball withdrawn you mark with the number n"). For that reason, this second interpretation should also 
be rejected. 
Let us consider then a third alternative interpretation. For it seems that an adequate interpretation of 
the numbered ball dispenser must do justice to Eckhardt' idea that it is impossible to make a random 
selection when there exists numerous unborn members in the reference class. Both previous 
interpretations of the numbered ball dispenser fail to incorporate this latter idea. But consider now the 
following variation of the numbered ball dispenser: 
 
The synchronic and deterministic numbered ball dispenser An opaque device contains an urn 
that has 10 balls at T0, but will ultimately have either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. The final 
number of balls in the urn will be determined by the flipping of a fair coin at T0. If heads, it will 
add 990 numbered balls (#11 to #1000) in the urn a given time Ti (1 ≤ i < 10), say at T6. If tails, 
it will do nothing at T6. At time T1, you randomly draw the ball #e from the urn and then replace 
it in the urn. Then a device expels at T1 the ball #1, at T2 the ball #2..., at Tn the ball #n. Now, 
according to the outcome of the random drawing performed at T1, the device stops at Te when 
the ball #e is expelled. At this step, you formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions with P(Hfew) = 
P(Hmany) = 0.5 and you try to evaluate the number of balls which were contained at T0 in the urn.  
You formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions relating to the total number of balls in the urn at 
T6 with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5. Now you know all the above and you get the ball #5 at T5 
when the device stops. You conclude then that the prior probabilities remain unchanged. 
 
An instance of the synchronic and deterministic numbered ball dispenser is then as follows: 
 
time T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
flipping tails      
range  1-10 2-10 3-10 4-10 5-10 
random #  5     
ball #  1 2 3 4 5 
 
The novelty in this variation is that the urn contains 10 balls at the beginning but 990 other balls are 
eventually added later, say at T6, depending on the outcome of a coin's toss. If the coin lands tails, 
nothing is done at T6 and the urn remains with only 10 balls, the ball being drawn continuously in the 
range [1, 10]. If the coin lands heads, 990 balls are added in the urn at T6. In this last case, the ball is 
drawn in the range [1, 10] until T6, but from T6 onwards, the ball is drawn in the range [1, 1000]. The 
protocol of this experiment can be described more generally in the following terms: if the urn contains 
only 10 balls, a ball is drawn randomly in the range [1, 10]. But if the urn contains 1000 balls, a ball is 
drawn randomly in the range [1, 1000]. Thus, the ball is drawn randomly, according to the actual 
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number of balls in the urn. At this step, it should be apparent that this latter protocol does justice to 
Eckhardt's idea that it is impossible to make a random selection when there exists numerous unborn 
members in the reference class. In the present experiment the 990 balls that are added at T6 represent 
those unborn members and the random process operates in the range [1, 10] until T6, even in the case 
where the reference class will ultimately contain 1000 balls. Under these conditions, the synchronic 
and deterministic numbered ball dispenser appears well as a more robust variation of the numbered 
ball dispenser, which fully incorporates Eckhardt's insight. This latter variation does not face the above 
criticism of inaccuracy in its protocol. In this last situation, it would be plainly erroneous to conclude 
to a Bayesian shift in favor of the Hfew hypothesis. What is rational to infer in this situation, though, is 
that the prior probabilities remain unchanged. 
At this step, it is worth pointing out that the synchronic and deterministic numbered ball dispenser 
has another virtue. In effect, it now incorporates an element of randomness, given that the number of 
the ball is first drawn randomly in [1, 10]. The corresponding variation is much in line with the 
intuition that we are in some sense random humans. Consequently, this variation does justice to the 
idea that at least in some sense, our birth rank can be considered as random. 
At this step, it is worth pointing out that a diachronic variation of the preceding experiment can even 
be envisaged. For consider the following variant of the numbered ball dispenser: 
 
The diachronic and deterministic numbered ball dispenser An opaque device contains an urn 
that has 10 balls at T0, but will ultimately have either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. The final 
number of balls in the urn will be determined by the flipping of a fair coin at T0. If heads, it will 
add 990 numbered balls (#11 to #1000) in the urn a given time Ti (1 ≤ i < 10), say at T6. If tails, 
it will do nothing at T6. At time T1, a robot inside the device draws a ball18 at random in the urn 
(containing the balls #1 to #10) and the device expels the ball #1; if the ball #1 has been drawn 
then the device stops at T1; else at T2, the robot draws a ball at random in the urn (now 
containing the balls #2 to #10) and the device expels the ball #2; if the ball #2 has been drawn 
then the device stops at T2; ...; else at Ti, the robot draws a ball at random in the urn (now 
containing the balls #i to #n) and the device expels the ball #i; if the ball #i has been drawn then 
the device stops at Ti; else at Ti+1, etc. You formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions relating to 
the total number of balls at T6 with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5. Now you know all the above and 
you get the ball #5 at T5 when the device stops. You conclude then that the prior probabilities 
remain unchanged. 
 
An instance of the diachronic and deterministic numbered ball dispenser is then as follows: 
 
time T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
flipping tails      
range  1-10 2-10 3-10 4-10 5-10 
random #  8 3 9 9 5 
ball #  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
5. The Issue of Indeterminism 
 
Let us examine now whether both preceding models are affected or not by the issue of indeterminism 
which arises in the context of DA. This latter issue is important, since Leslie notably considers that 
DA is considerably weakened if our world is of an indeterministic nature. Leslie acknowledges in 
effect that DA must be weakened if the fate of the human race is indeterministic when he evokes:19 
"(...) the potentially much stronger objection that the number of names in the doomsday argument's 
imaginary urn, the number of all humans who will ever have lived, has not yet been firmly settled 
because the world is indeterministic". 
                                                          
18
 After the ball is drawn, it is replaced in the urn. 
19
 Cf. Leslie (1993, p. 490). 
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At this step, it should be pointed out that some variations of the preceding experiments are capable of 
handling an indeterministic situation, namely where the total number of balls in the urn is unknown at 
the time where the experiment begins and is only settled with certainty during the course of the 
experiment. As an example, the following variation of the two-urn case++ takes into account an 
indeterministic situation: 
 
The diachronic and indeterministic two-urn case++ An opaque device contains an urn that has 
10 balls at T0, but will ultimately have either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. The final number of 
balls in the urn will remain undetermined until an internal mechanism will flip a quantum coin20 
at a given time Ti (1 ≤ i < 10). If heads, it will add 990 numbered balls (#11 to #1000) in the urn 
at Ti. If tails, it will do nothing. At time T1, a random generator inside the device issues a 
number in the range [1, 1000] and the device expels the ball #1; if the number 1 has been issued 
then the device stops at T1; else at T2, the random generator issues a number in the range [2, 
1000] and the device expels the ball #2; if the number 2 has been issued then the device stops at 
T2; ...; else at Ti-1, the random generator issues a number in the range [i-1, 1000] and the device 
expels the ball #i-1; if the number i-1 has been issued then the device stops at Ti-1; else at Ti (1 ≤ 
i < 10), the random generator issues a number in the range [i, n] (the total number of balls in the 
urn after the flipping of the coin is n) and the device expels the ball #i; if the number i has been 
issued then the device stops at Ti; else at Ti+1, etc. Now you know all the above and you get the 
ball #e at Te when the device stops. You formulate the Hfew and Hmany assumptions relating to 
the total number of balls in the urn after the flipping of the coin with P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5. 
Now you know all the above and you get the ball #5 at T5 when the device stops. You conclude 
then to an upward Bayesian shift in favor of the Hfew hypothesis. 
 
An instance of the diachronic and indeterministic two-urn case++ is then as follows: 
 
time T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
flipping    tails   
range  1-1000 2-1000 3-1000 4-10 5-10 
random #  857 326 92 9 5 
ball #  1 2 3 4 5 
 
The novelty in this variation is that it handles an indeterministic situation. In effect, the number of 
balls present in the urn is unknown at the time where the first ball is expelled and is only settled at Ti. 
Such a variation shows that a random selection can even be made when the number of balls in the urn 
is unknown at the time where the random process begins. And this appears as a counter-example to 
Eckhardt's attack against the random sampling assumption in DA, based on the impossibility of 
making a random selection when there exists many unborn members in the given reference class. The 
diachronic and indeterministic two-urn case++ shows that a random selection can even be made, under 
certain indeterministic circumstances. 
However, it should be acknowledged that this only partly undermines Eckhardt's point. For it could 
be retorted that the above experiment does not handle every type of indeterministic situation and that 
Eckhardt could provide a counterpart of both the diachronic and indeterministic two-urn case++. In 
effect, Eckhardt could reply that what he has in mind is an experiment of the following type: 
 
The diachronic and indeterministic numbered ball dispenser
 
An opaque device contains an urn 
that has 10 balls at T0, but will ultimately have either 10 or 1000 numbered balls. The final 
number of balls in the urn will remain undetermined until an internal mechanism will flip a 
quantum coin at a given time Ti (1 ≤ i < 10). If heads, it will add 990 numbered balls (#11 to 
#1000) in the urn at Ti. If tails, it will do nothing. At time T1 a robot inside the device draws a 
ball at random in the urn (containing the balls #1 to #10) and the device expels the ball #1; if the 
number 1 has been issued then the device stops at T1; else at T2, a robot inside the device draws 
a ball at random in the urn (containing the balls #2 to #10)  and the device expels the ball #2; if 
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 This works as well if one chooses a fair coin instead. 
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the number 2 has been issued then the device stops at T2; ...; else at Ti-1, a robot inside the 
device draws a ball at random in the urn (containing the balls # i-1 to #10) and the device expels 
the ball #i-1; if the number i-1 has been issued then the device stops at Ti-1; else at Ti, a robot 
inside the device draws a ball at random in the urn (containing the balls #i to # n) (the total 
number of balls in the urn after the flipping of the coin is n) and the device expels the ball #i; if 
the number i has been issued then the device stops at Ti; else at Ti+1, etc. Now you know all the 
above and you get the ball #5 at T5 when the device stops. You formulate the Hfew and Hmany 
assumptions relating to the total number of balls in the urn after the flipping of the coin, with 
P(Hfew) = P(Hmany) = 0.5. You conclude then that the prior probabilities remain unchanged. 
 
An instance of the diachronic and indeterministic numbered ball dispenser
 
is as follows: 
 
time T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
flipping    tails   
range  1-10 2-10 3-10 4-10 5-10 
random #  7 6 10 7 5 
ball #  1 2 3 4 5 
 
To the difference of the preceding case, the random drawing of the ball is made here in the range [1, 
10] until the flipping of the coin. This increases the probability that the device stops, says at T5, even if 
the urn will ultimately contain 1000 balls, after the coin has eventually landed heads. In such a case, 
the drawing of the ball #5 at random gives us no grounds for concluding to a Bayesian shift in favor of 
the Hfew assumption. In effect, in this last situation, it is very probable to draw a number in the range 
[1, 10], even if the coin lands heads at Ti. 
At this step, it should be apparent that taking into account the issue of indeterminism gives us no clue 
for deciding whether the incremental two-urn case or the numbered ball dispenser is an adequate 
model for the human situation corresponding to DA. In effect, both models admit of a variation which 
is capable of modeling a human situation of an indeterministic nature. 
 
 
6. The Third Route 
 
Given the above developments, we are now in a position to evaluate the adequacy of the analogy 
underlying DA. We now face two competing analogies with the human situation corresponding to DA. 
At this stage, the question that arises is the following: Is the human situation corresponding to DA 
analogous to (i) the two-urn case++ or to (ii) the numbered ball dispenser? As we have seen, each 
model comes in three variations – i.e. deterministic-synchronic, deterministic-diachronic, 
indeterministic-diachronic) – which constitute strong variations of their respective original models, 
since they are not vulnerable to several objections that can be pressed against their original ancestors. 
At this step, the following question arises: Does there exist an objective criterion allowing the 
preferential choice of one of the two competing models? Is there any clue that allows for preferring the 
two-urn case++ or the numbered ball dispenser to model the human situation corresponding to DA? Let 
us proceed now to review whether any such objective criterion is available.  
Both Leslie and Eckhardt give reasons to justify the preferential choice of their favorite model. I 
shall examine these latter justifications in turn. To begin with, Leslie's motivation for the preferential 
choice of the two-urn case++ results from countering a commonly raised objection based on the 
consideration that people of the future are not alive yet. The corresponding line of defense notably 
results from the emerald experiment (1996, p. 20):21 
 
Imagine an experiment planned as follows. At some point in time, three humans would each be given an 
emerald. Several centuries afterwards, when a completely different set of humans was alive, five 
thousands humans would again each be given an emerald in the experiment. You have no knowledge, 
however, of whether your century is the earlier century in which just three people were to be in this 
situation, or the later century in which five thousand were to be in it. Do you say to yourself that if yours 
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 Cf. also Leslie (1993, p. 489). 
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were the earlier century then the five thousand people wouldn't be alive yet, and that therefore you'd have 
no chance of being among them? On this basis, do you conclude that you might just as well bet that you 
lived in the earlier century? 
Suppose you in fact betted that you lived there. If every emerald getter in the experiment betted in this 
way, there would be five thousand losers and only three winners. The sensible bet, therefore, is that yours 
is instead the later century of the two. 
 
Leslie's remark is targeted at demonstrating (successfully, I think) that a DA-like reasoning can validly 
take place, even if there exist some unborn members in the reference class. However, Leslie 
acknowledges that DA is weakened if our world is indeterministic, i.e. if the total number of humans 
who will ever have lived is not presently settled. As we have seen, this latter situation corresponds to 
some variations of the numbered ball dispenser, notably the indeterministic numbered ball dispenser. 
On the other hand, Eckhardt's justification for the preferential choice of the numbered ball dispenser 
is twofold. Eckhardt stresses first the fact that our birth rank is nonrandom. But there is a strong 
intuition that we are, at least for a given reference class, random humans and consequently, our birth 
rank can also be random. But Eckhardt argues, second, and more convincingly, for the impossibility of 
drawing a random number without knowing the total size of the reference class. The different 
variations of the numbered ball dispenser described above incorporate this latter insight. However, one 
possible weakness in Eckhardt's account is that he denies the analogy with the lottery case (in our 
framework, the two-urn case++) in all cases. But how can we have the certainty that an analogy with 
the two-urn case++ does not hold, for a given reference class? 
Although both Leslie and Eckhardt offer strong justifications for their favorite model, it appears that 
they do not provide sufficient objective motivation for ruling out the opposite model. For Leslie 
openly accepts that his favorite analogy with the lottery case could fail in some indeterministic cases, 
thus allowing for the numbered ball dispenser to apply. On the other hand, Eckhardt does not expose 
the objective motivation for rejecting the analogy with the two-urn case++ in all cases. As a result, we 
are still left with an indeterminate situation. Let us then investigate whether any of the two competing 
models has an advantage over the other for modeling accurately the specific features of the human 
situation corresponding to DA. It is worth pointing out preliminarily that from an external viewpoint, 
there is no difference between the two models. In effect, from an observer's viewpoint, the external 
sequence consists in the expulsion of the balls #1 at T1, #2 at T2, #3 at T3, ..., #e at Te, whether one 
considers the two-urn case++ or the numbered ball dispenser. This corresponds adequately to the 
temporal feature of the human situation corresponding to DA. Hence, from this viewpoint, the analogy 
proves to be strongly established in both cases. 
Let us turn now to the internal part of both experiments, concerning in particular what relates to the 
random process. As we have seen, both models admit of a synchronic variation where the random 
drawing is made at T0 and a diachronic variation where the random drawing is made gradually from T1 
to Te. In consequence, both models are capable of modeling adequately the random process22 that 
determines the birth rank of each human. Whether such random drawing has been made before the 
beginning of humankind or perhaps more plausibly, during the course of the existence of the human 
race doesn't matter. For the two-urn case++ and the numbered ball dispenser both admit of respective 
variations which are capable of handling adequately these two types of situations. At this stage, it 
appears that both models are capable of modeling adequately the random process that determines the 
birth rank of each human. From this viewpoint, the two competing models are still on a par for the 
modelization of situations which differ according to the synchronic/diachronic distinction. 
Let us consider then the deterministic/indeterministic distinction. Does any of the two models has an 
advantage over the other for modeling adequately a deterministic or an indeterministic situation? From 
the above, it results that both alternative models admit of variations which are capable of handling 
either a deterministic or an indeterministic situation.  
To sum up now. From the above, it results that both models admit of respectively three variations, 
i.e. deterministic-synchronic, deterministic-diachronic, indeterministic-diachronic. An immediate 
consequence is that the two models are equally suited for modeling adequately the different modalities 
of the human situation corresponding to DA, depending on the synchronic/diachronic or on the 
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 To put it metaphorically. Needless to say, such random process need not be taken at face value. 
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deterministic/indeterministic distinction. The upshot is that this equally powerful modeling ability of 
the two competing models still leaves us with an indeterminate situation. 
 
At this stage, it appears that we lack an objective criterion allowing for deciding rationally whether 
the two-urn case++ or the numbered ball dispenser is the relevant model for the human situation 
corresponding to DA. In the lack of objective evidence, it is then wise to apply a principle of 
indifference, which leads to retain both models as roughly equiprobable. What remains then in force, 
is an indeterminate situation. At this stage, it appears that we are on a third route: either the two-urn 
case++ or the numbered ball dispenser applies to the human situation corresponding to DA. In this 
context, both Leslie's and Eckhardt's positions can be regarded as monist attitudes. For the preferential 
choice of either the two-urn case++ or the numbered ball dispenser appears well as a one-sided attitude. 
By contrast, the present view, based on a third route, is of a pluralist nature. For it seems that an 
adequate model should reflect the fundamental property of being two-sided. Perhaps if the present 
view were grounded on a purely disjunctive model, i.e. corresponding to the definition that either 
Leslie's or Eckhardt's position were true, there would be serious grounds for doubting that there would 
be something interestingly novel in the third route. But as will become clearer later, the truth is that the 
third route entails that both two-urn case++ and numbered ball dispenser apply to the human situation 
corresponding to DA. The essence of the third route is then pluralistically based on a conjunctive 
treatment of both Leslie's and Eckhardt's models. In short, both models work. But explaining how both 
models apply without appealing to any paraconsistent logic requires that we delve more deeply into 
the underpinnings of the reference class problem. 
 
 
7. The Reference Class Problem 
 
Let us recall first the reference class problem.23 Roughly, it is the problem of how to define 'humans'. 
More accurately, it can be stated as follows: How can the reference class be objectively defined for 
DA-purposes? For an extensive or restrictive definition of the reference class can be provided. An 
extensively defined reference class would include for example the somewhat exotic future evolutions 
of humankind, for example with an average I.Q. of 200 or with backward causation abilities. 
Conversely, a restrictively designed reference class would only include those humans who correspond 
accurately to the characteristics of, say, homo sapiens sapiens, thus excluding the past homo sapiens 
neandertalensis and the future homo sapiens supersapiens. To put it more in adequation with our 
current taxonomy, the reference class can be defined at different levels which correspond respectively 
to the supergenus superhomo, the homo genus, the homo sapiens species, the homo sapiens sapiens 
subspecies, etc. At this step, it appears that we lack an objective criterion to choose the corresponding 
level non-arbitrarily. 
Leslie's treatment of the reference class problem is exposed in the response made to Eckhardt (1993) 
and in Leslie (1996).24 Leslie's solution to the reference class problem goes as follows. According to 
Leslie, one can choose the reference class more or less as one wishes, i.e. at a somewhat arbitrary 
level. Once the relevant choice performed, it suffices to adjust the prior probabilities accordingly to 
get the argument moving. Leslie's sole condition is that the reference class should not be chosen at an 
extreme level of extension or of restriction.25 Furthermore, Leslie addresses the resulting fact that each 
human belongs to several different classes, restrictively or extensively defined. However, this is not a 
problem from Leslie's standpoint, since the argument works for all these classes. In effect, a Bayesian 
shift ensues for whatever reference class arbitrarily chosen, at a somewhat reasonable level of 
extension or of restriction. Leslie illustrates this point with an urn analogy. To the difference of the 
two-urn case, he considers an urn that contains balls of different colors, say red and green. A red ball 
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 The reference class problem in probability theory is notably exposed in Hájek (2002, s. 3.3). For a treatment 
of the reference class problem in the context of DA, see notably Eckhardt (1993, 1997), Bostrom (1997, 2002, 
ch. 4 pp. 69-72 and ch. 5), Franceschi (1998, 1999).  The point of Franceschi (1999) can be construed as a 
treatment of the reference class problem in confirmation theory. 
24
 In the part entitled 'Just who should count as being human?' (pp. 256-63). 
25
 Cf. 1996, p. 260: 'Widenings of reference class can easily be taken too far.' and p. 261: 'Again, some ways of 
narrowing a reference class might perhaps seem inappropriate.'. 
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is drawn from the urn. In this context, from a restrictive viewpoint, the ball is a random red ball and 
there is no difference in this case with the classical two-urn case. But from a more extensive 
viewpoint, it is also a random red-or-green ball.26 According to Leslie, although the prior probabilities 
are different in each case, a Bayesian shift ensues in both cases.27 In sum, on Leslie's view, the 
reference class problem can be overcome because the argument works for all somewhat reasonably 
defined reference classes. 
By contrast, Eckhardt's treatment of the reference class problem stresses the difficulty, for the same 
individual, of being simultaneously random in several different classes: "(...) do we have  better reason 
to believe that we are random human than random vertebrates or random social animals? Can the same 
item be random in all these classes? Isn't a random human a rather exceptional vertebrate?" (1993, p. 
483). We shall return to these reservations later. 
At this step, one might wonder what treatment of the reference class problem results from the third 
route. To begin with, it is worth reframing the reference class problem into the above-mentioned 
taxonomy of experiments. Now it appears that the two-urn case++ and the numbered ball dispenser can 
be easily adapted, in order to incorporate the elements of the reference class problem. In both models, 
it suffices to consider in replacement of the original one-color experiment a two-color one, i.e. where 
the 10 first balls are red and the 990 other balls are green. Now the urn is filled with red-or-green balls 
and a given red ball (or a green ball) can also be considered as a red-or-green ball. From the third 
route's viewpoint, there exists some classes for which Leslie's model works and some other classes for 
which Eckhardt's model prevails. Let us examine this in more detail. Suppose then that for a given 
reference class, we have the absolute certainty that the two-urn case++ holds (whichever variation – 
whether synchronic or diachronic, deterministic or indeterministic – will do the job). A Bayesian shift 
then ensues for this latter reference class. Now it could well be that the extinction of this latter class 
will be followed by the appearance of another class, slightly different. For such type of situation is 
very common among evolutionary species. Now the consequence is that for a slightly more extended 
class, the numbered ball dispenser is the adequate model. In this case, the two-urn case++  holds for a 
given reference class, while the numbered ball dispenser applies for a slightly more extended 
reference class which includes the former. Consequently, for the same individual which belongs to 
both classes, the two-urn case++ holds for a given reference class while the numbered ball dispenser 
also holds for a slightly more extended class. To put it otherwise, according to the conjunctive essence 
of the third route, the two-urn case++ holds from a restrictive viewpoint and the numbered ball 
dispenser applies from an extensive standpoint.  
Let us illustrate now the above remarks through an example related to our past situation. This will 
also deserve the purpose of highlighting a second important point. Leslie addresses then the case of a 
neandertalian who would have implemented a DA-like reasoning:28 
 
Consider the protest that any Stone Age man who had used the argument would have been led to the 
erroneous conclusion that the human race would soon die out. A first reply is: So what? It is not a defect 
in any merely probabilistic argument if it leads someone improbably situated - someone very early in 
time, maybe, or someone who has thrown a dozen dice with eyes shut and expects (mistakenly, in view of 
what is actually on the table) not to see a dozen sixes upon opening them - to an erroneous conclusion. 
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 Cf. Leslie (1996, p. 259): 'Suppose all the balls in the urn are numbered. A ball is drawn. It turns out to be 
bright red. Note that it is not only a bright red ball whose number has been drawn at random from the numbers 
of all the bright red balls in the urn, but also a red-or-reddish ball whose number has been drawn at random from 
the numbers of all the red-or-reddish balls in the urn.'. 
27
 Cf. Leslie (1996, pp. 258-9): 'The thing to note is that the red ball can be treated either just as a red ball or else 
as a red-or-green ball. Bayes's Rule applies in both cases. When we're interested in how many red balls there are 
in the urn, we need to treat the ball just as a red ball. The 'prior probabilities' entering into our Bayesian 
calculation are then probabilities for such and such numbers of red balls. When, in contrast, what interests us is 
how many red-or-green balls the urn contains, then we have to treat the red ball as red-or-green. 
Correspondingly, the prior probabilities entering into the calculation are the prior probabilities of various 
numbers of balls in the red-or-green-ball class. [...] All this evidently continues to apply to when being-red-or-
green is replaced by being-red-or-pink, or being-red-or-reddish.'. 
28
 Cf. (1992, pp. 527-8). 
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From the fact that Leslie considers the neandertalian's conclusion as erroneous, it is implicit here that 
the corresponding reference class is the somewhat extensively defined homo sapiens species. Leslie's 
treatment of the neandertalian case is fully in adequation with the two-urn case++. Leslie acknowledges 
the fact that a neandertalian who would have implemented a DA-like reasoning related to the homo 
sapiens reference class would have been led to a false conclusion. But on Leslie's view, this is due to 
the above-mentioned29 fact that the reasoning based on the two-urn case does not yield absolute 
certainty. It works in most cases but exceptionally early members of the reference can be led to an 
erroneous conclusion, despite the soundness of their DA-like reasoning. 
Let us analyze now the neandertalian case from the third route's standpoint. I shall assume in the 
following that our current taxonomy is the best objective guide at our disposal for drawing relevant 
distinctions among reference classes. Historically, the homo sapiens neandertalensis subspecies has 
appeared on the earth near -200.000 BCE and then became extinct near -35.000 BCE. On the other 
hand, our current subspecies homo sapiens sapiens has appeared near -120.000 BCE. From the above, 
it results that, from the viewpoint of a neandertalian, we need to distinguish two cases: (i) from 
-200.000 to -120.000 BCE, where homo sapiens neandertalensis has been the sole representative on 
the earth of the homo sapiens species. By contrast, from (ii) -120.000 to -35.000 BCE, the earth has 
been populated simultaneously with two coexistent members of the homo sapiens species, i.e. homo 
sapiens neandertalensis and homo sapiens sapiens. 
Let us begin then (i) with the first period, i.e. from -200.000 to -120.000 BCE. At this time, homo 
sapiens neandertalensis is the unique representative on the earth of the homo sapiens species, but also 
of the homo genus, of the superhomo supergenus, etc. Now the question is: Which reference class is 
relevant for DA-purposes? The point is that the neandertalian can consider herself at a somewhat 
restrictive level, as a member of the homo sapiens neandertalensis subspecies, or at a slightly more 
extensive level as a member of the homo sapiens species. 30 Now it appears that there would have been 
nothing wrong had the neandertalian identified the reference class with homo sapiens neandertalensis. 
For the neandertalian had serious grounds for considering herself as a random sample of the somewhat 
restrictively defined homo sapiens neandertalensis class. In this case, the neandertalian would have 
concluded, in virtue of the third route's line of reasoning, that either the two-urn case++ or the 
numbered ball dispenser applies to the homo sapiens neandertalensis class. 
On the other hand, had the neandertalian identified the reference class with the wider homo sapiens 
species, an immediate qualm would have pressed: Is a member of the homo sapiens neandertalensis 
class (red balls) representative of the wider homo sapiens (red-or-green balls) class? For this latter 
class, the reasoning of the neandertalian goes, could include further members such as, say, homo 
sapiens sapiens (green balls), who could well appear during the course of evolution. And the point is, 
the neandertalian could pursue, that I only see members of the homo sapiens neandertalensis 
subspecies around me, and no other representative of other subspecies belonging to the homo sapiens 
species is present. This gives me strong grounds for not considering myself (and my associated birth 
rank) as a random sample of the homo sapiens class. To put it in terms of balls: since I only draw red 
balls, I cannot reasonably consider these latter as representative samples of the class of red-or-green 
balls, in order to draw inductive conclusions. Put otherwise: drawing only red balls give me strong 
grounds for preferring the hypothesis that the urn contains only red balls over the hypothesis that it 
contains red and green balls. Now the fact that she cannot consider herself as a random sample of the 
wider homo sapiens class, precludes the neandertalian from applying the DA-like reasoning to this 
latter class. Considering then that it is well possible that some unborn members belonging to other 
species of the homo sapiens class are not currently taken into account, the neandertalian would then 
better leave her prior probabilities unchanged, in accordance with the numbered ball dispenser. 
Let us envisage now (ii) the second period from (ii) -120.000 to -35.000 BCE. At this time, there are 
simultaneously two representative subspecies of the homo sapiens species (red-or-green balls) which 
cohabit on the earth: homo sapiens neandertalensis (red balls) and homo sapiens sapiens (green balls). 
Now the neandertalian could choose, just as previously, the homo sapiens neandertalensis class and 
reason in a similar fashion. But in this case, the neandertalian could also legitimately choose the wider 
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 Cf. §1. 
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 To simplify matters, only two competing reference classes are envisaged here. The same goes if one extends 
the choice to other wider subdivisions of the taxonomy, such as the superhomo supergenus, etc. 
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homo sapiens class. For now the neandertalian has strong grounds for considering that she is randomly 
drawn from the homo sapiens (red-or-green balls), since she observes both representatives of the homo 
sapiens neandertalensis (red balls) subspecies and of the homo sapiens sapiens subspecies (green 
balls). 
Let us turn now to our present situation. Begin with the choice of the appropriate reference class. 
Will we consider the homo sapiens sapiens subspecies or the homo sapiens species as relevant for DA-
purposes? At present time, there is only one single representative subspecies – homo sapiens sapiens – 
of the homo sapiens species on the earth. For the same reason that for the neandertalian during the first 
period from -200.000 to -120.000 BCE, this precludes us from choosing the homo sapiens species as 
the appropriate reference class. This leaves us with a reference class which identifies itself with the 
homo sapiens sapiens subspecies. Now according to the third route, there exists equal grounds for 
applying either the two-urn case++ or the numbered ball dispenser to this latter reference class. 
Suppose now that the two-urn case++ holds. Then it could well be the case that the extinction of homo 
sapiens sapiens subspecies will be followed by the appearance of the much-evolved homo sapiens 
supersapiens subspecies. Finally, this renders finally DA innocuous. Put in terms of the third route's 
viewpoint on the reference class problem, it entails that the two-urn case++ applies to the restricted 
homo sapiens sapiens class while the numbered ball dispenser applies to the wider homo sapiens 
class. This ambivalent effect has the effect of depriving the original argument from its initial terror. 
Finally, this gives a way of accepting its conclusion by rendering the argument less counterintuitive 
than in its original formulation. 
This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument. What results from the foregoing 
developments is that the Doomsday Argument must be weakened in two ways. On the one hand, for a 
given reference class, it should be acknowledged that either the two-urn case++ or the numbered ball 
dispenser holds. On closer scrutiny, this is not very far from Leslie's own position. Recall: DA is 
significantly weakened if our world is indeterministic. But Leslie's conception of an indeterministic 
world fits well with the sort of device that constitutes the numbered ball dispenser. On the other hand, 
the reference class problem must be taken into account, thus leading to the conclusion that DA could 
work for a given reference class. But if there existed a given reference class for which the argument 
were conclusive, this latter class could well be incorporated into a more extensive class for which a 
two-color version of the numbered ball dispenser would apply. This finally renders the argument 
innocuous, by depriving it of its initially associated terror. At the same time, this leaves room for the 
argument to be successful for a given reference class, but without its counterintuitive consequences. 
Given these two sidesteps, the resulting novel formulation of the argument could well be more 
consensual than the original one. 
Lastly, what precedes casts light on an essential facet of the Doomsday Argument. For on a narrow 
sense, it is an argument about the fate of humankind. But on a broad sense (the one I have been 
concerned with) it emphasizes the difficulty of applying probabilistic models to real-life situations,31 a 
difficulty which is usually largely underestimated. This opens a path to a whole field of practical 
interest, consisting of a taxonomy of probabilistic models, whose philosophical importance would 
have been unravelled without John Leslie's robust and courageous defence of the argument.32 
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